

D R A F T

ASSIGNMENT OF ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL
TO SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD

Memorandum by the Secretariat,
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine the need for assignment of additional personnel to the Secretariat of the Security Advisory Board or consider the advisability of:

a. Transferring the activities of the Security Advisory Board to NIA jurisdiction.

b. Establishing the SAB as a separate agency by Executive Order.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The Acting Secretary of the Security Advisory Board has requested the following personnel be assigned to the Secretariat, SAB, to perform the duties shown opposite each position:

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1 officer (Army) - Training Officer | |
| 1 officer (Navy) - Survey (Documentary Security Officer) | |
| 1 official (State) - Secretary | } Now presently assigned
- from the State Department. |
| 1 OAF-5 (State) - Stenographer | |

"A"
(The Appendix sets forth justification for the above positions.)

3. Paragraph 11 of SWNCC 252/2 provides for a separate Secretariat for the Board to be furnished by the State, War, and Navy Departments; however, in approving SWNCC 252/2, the Committee agreed to defer action on the question of establishing a separate secretariat for the SAB and instructed the SAB to consult with the SWNCC Secretariat for the purpose of submitting to SWNCC joint detailed recommendations as to its secretariat requirements.

4. The SWNCC Secretariat, at its present strength, cannot furnish the above personnel for this work.

DISCUSSION

5. The SWNCC Secretariat considers that the above request together with other factors raises the question of whether or not SAB should be continued as a Subcommittee of SWNCC due to the following trend of events which have transpired since its formation:

a. The National Intelligence Authority has been completely organized and has a security section whose duties may eventually parallel or overlap the duties of SAB. Informal conversations between the SWNCC Secretariat and personnel of the NIA Secretariat indicate that NIA would be willing to assume certain, if not all, of the SAB functions.

b. The President has recently created a commission composed of representatives of the Justice, State, Treasury, War and the Navy Departments and of the Civil Service Commission, with the representative from the Justice Department to serve as Chairman, to draw up recommendations for any legislation thought necessary to keep disloyal and subversive persons out of the Civil Service. The President also called for suggestions on the following points:

(1) Whether existing security procedures in the Executive Branch of the Government furnish adequate protection against the employment or continuance of employment of disloyal or subversive persons, and what agency or agencies should be charged with prescribing and supervising security procedures.

(2) Whether responsibility for acting upon investigative reports dealing with disloyal or subversive persons should be left to the agencies employing them, or whether a single agency should handle it.

(3) What procedure should be established for notifying allegedly disloyal or subversive employees or applicants for employment of the charges made against them, and what procedure should be established to guarantee a fair hearing on such charges.

(4) What standards are desirable for judging the loyalty of employees of the government and applicants for such employment.

(5) Whether further legislation is necessary for the adequate protection of the government against the employment or continuance in employment of disloyal or subversive persons.

In view of the above, it is believed that any action taken by this commission will affect the functions of SAB.

c. Approval by the Committee of SWNCC 252/2 was qualified by the following:

"As the proposed functions of the Board are purely advisory your committee is of the opinion that no Presidential or Congressional authority is required to make the Board more effective. However, if experience should indicate at a later date that such authority is required, this policy question could be referred to SWNCC for determination."

d. It now appears that the Board's functions could more properly be carried out if it were created by an Executive Order. An attempt was made to establish this Board by Executive Order while it was under the jurisdiction of the Office of War Information, but it was decided by the Bureau of the Budget and the OWI General Council that the Executive Order of the OWI provided sufficient authority for the Board activities. The OWI is now non-existent.

e. Appendix "B" sets forth the Bureau of the Budget's views with respect to the continuation of the Board as a Subcommittee of SWNCC.

f. One of the functions of the Security Advisory Board requires the establishment of security requirements and procedures for clearance of civilian officials to receive classified material. In Security Advisory Board Memorandum No. 3, the Board set forth certain minimum standards for the clearance of civilian officials to receive Top Secret and Secret information, requiring as one

of the minimum standards the check of FBI subversive files of the official. Some agencies in an attempt to comply with the provisions of SAB 3 were met with refusal by the FBI because of the limited funds and personnel of the FBI. An informal arrangement was then made whereby the FBI would conduct a limited number of name checks on behalf of these agencies through the medium of the Security Advisory Board. In a recent memorandum, the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, advised the Board that the FBI was terminating the arrangement whereby the Board was able to secure name checks for civilian agencies. Since the FBI does not make checks directly for many of the agencies in the government, the Board is placed in the position of having to rely upon the State, War and Navy Departments for these name checks or discontinue this function altogether, which will make for lower standards in personnel security in many agencies and eliminate this function of the Security Advisory Board.

CONCLUSIONS

6. It is concluded that:

a. The final disposition of the Board should be held in abeyance pending the findings of the commission appointed by the President (paragraph 5 b above).

b. Pending this commission's findings, and, if the Board is to be continued as a Subcommittee of SWNCC, the personnel listed above should be assigned to the SAB Secretariat to enable the Board to carry out efficiently its presently assigned tasks.

c. The problem raised above should be reconsidered by SWNCC when final decision on the commission's report has been made by the President.

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended that:

a. SWNCC approve the above conclusions.

b. After approval, the SWNCC Secretariat request the State, War and Navy Departments to assign the additional personnel to the Secretariat of the Security Advisory Board.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : CIA-RDP64-00658A000100250002-9
OFFICE OF COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION

17 December 1946

MEMORANDUM TO: Acting Secretary, N.I.A.
(Through: Chief, ICAPS)

Subject: Security Advisory Board

1. By informal reference from the Acting Secretary, NIA, the comments of the Security Branch of this Office were invited upon paragraph 5a of the attached draft memorandum by the SWNCC Secretariat which discusses the need of the SAB Secretariat for additional personnel and the advisability of (a) transferring the activities of SAB to NIA jurisdiction or (b) establishing the SAB as a separate agency by Executive Order.

2. The following comments are offered only in conjunction with those SAB functions which could be usefully performed by CIG; they are not applicable to the security procedures relative to the employment of persons by government agencies which fall more properly within the purview of the Department of Justice and of the newly created Presidential Commission which is to recommend legislation to keep disloyal and subversive persons out of the Civil Service.

3. Pertinent functions of the Assistant Director for Security (to be discharged upon activation of his Office) which would seem to parallel or overlap those of the SAB are:

"a. As authorized by the National Intelligence Authority, formulates and disseminates coordinated Federal security policies and procedures pertaining to the safeguarding of classified information and matter of the departments and agencies of the United States Government in the interests of the national security.

b. Determines adequacy of security controls in the non-participating Federal agencies and, from a security standpoint, passes on their eligibility to receive CIG intelligence information and intelligence."

4. The revised terms of reference of the SAB, as set forth in SWNCC 252/4 which were approved by that committee by informal action on 4 November 1946, are:

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : CIA-RDP64-00658A000100250002-9

"a. Formulating policies and procedures relating to the declassification of documents originating in non-military agencies and departments.

b. Establishing security requirements and procedures for clearance of civilian officials to receive classified material.

c. Establishing standards for the conversion of security regulations for civilian agencies from a war-time to a peace-time basis, including Top Secret procedures.

d. Conducting surveys of security measures affecting administrative efficiency and physical security or affecting adversely the security of classified information.

e. Preparing studies and recommendations on matters referred to it by SWNCC.

f. Coordinating with other Federal agencies in developing security training programs and other procedures which are designed to promote security of classified information throughout Federal agencies."

5. In the event that SAB were dissolved, it would be natural for government agencies to turn to some existing interdepartmental intelligence agency for advice and assistance in connection with security matters. This is a service which CIG should be prepared to render and which it could furnish with only slight expansion of its planned personnel, since it must perform many of the above functions for itself and on behalf of the participating agencies of NIA. Such functions include those lettered from a through d in paragraph 4 above.

6. Function e could obviously be expanded to include references relating to security matters from all departments and agencies. Function f is a very useful one which would seem to fit logically into the terms of reference of CIG (see paragraphs 3d and 10 of the President's letter of 22 January 1946).

7. It is understood, however, that function b above has been interpreted in the various agencies and within SAB itself to include security clearances to be effected prior to employment of personnel for government service. This is a function which CIG would not be prepared to assume as that field belongs more properly to the Department of Justice and will be surveyed by the new commission (see paragraph 2 above). Function b of SAB, as written, is quite similar to function b (see paragraph 3b) of the proposed CIG Office of Security.

8. In the light of the foregoing discussion and of views previously expressed by the Bureau of the Budget to the effect that the SAB


Approved For Release 2000/09/11 : CIA-RDP64-00658A000100250002-9

SECRET

SECRET

functions should be placed under the NIA, it is recommended that the SWNCC Secretariat be informally notified by the NIA Secretariat of the prospective ability of CIG to take over current SAB functions, to include the files and presently assigned personnel of the SAB Secretariat.

25X1A



Captain, U. S. N.
Assistant Director for
Collection and Dissemination

SECRET